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Affirmative

Action in
Law Schools:
The Uneasy

Truce
Richard A. Epstein

This lecture was given on
September 12, 1991 while
Professor Epstein was serving as
the Koch Distinguished Professor
of Law and Economics at the
University of Kansas. The Koch
Distinguished Professorship of
Law and Economics is supported
by the Mary Robinson Koch Chair
in Law and Economics. The
lecture was specially adapted for
publication in this Journal.

Background and Framework
If modem legal education can identify an issue that has
generated more discussion and less agreement than
affirmative action, I should like to know what it is and how it
ought to be resolved. The question has become the most
contentious of our time, and the debate, I am sorry to say, has
often been more destructive than informative. In this speech I
will add my own small contribution to the ongoing
controversy in the hope that I can disentangle a number of
issues that are too easily confused with one another. I do not
think that any single person can bring this issue to closure. It
is enough, perhaps, to advance the discussion.
In talking about these issues, it is impossible to separate
the question of affirmative action from the larger issues of
social and political theory. While this is not the place to argue
anew for propositions that I have sought to defend elsewhere,
I do think that it is appropriate at the outset to indicate the
intellectual presuppositions that I bring to this issue. In
essence there are two major strands to my position. The first
is theoretical: what is the technology that one brings to decide
matters of entitlement? In general I belong to the camp of
thinkers which is broadly described as consequentialist; that
is, those who think that the decision between different legal
rules, or as the case may be, different social practices, should
be based on the consequences they generate for the groups
that they regulate.
Under this sort of theory, it is important to identify what
goal you seek to maximize and to state it in a way that is
universal and not exclusive, so that the gains and losses of all
persons are registered in the social calculus. This emphasis
leads me to embrace a Rawlsian veil of ignorance as a way of
asking people to make judgments about the future when
ignorance of their own position sets them on the path to virtue
notwithstanding their strong inclinations to advance their own
self-interest wherever possible. In some circumstances I have
been called a utilitarian, in others a Paretian, and in still others
an unthinking devotee of law and economics. All these labels
may be true, but until someone comes up with an alternative
method of political theory that skirts all the difficulties (be
they of prediction or aggregation) that dog my general
approach, I will regard the labels as descriptions and not
criticisms.

Richard A. Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished
Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.
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If methodology is one thing, then
political orientation is quite another.
With regard to most questions of rights
and duties within a legal system, I regard
myself as a limited government
libertarian who thinks that the state
should have far fewer powers than those
which are conceded to it today. In
general I think that government has two

The implicit
redistribution of wealth
from ich to poor

cannot be defended as a

major functions to perform, and possibly
a third, over which I am very uneasy.

Form of social

First, the use of public force is
appropriate to restrain force and fraud.
Second, public force can be used, if just
compensation is provided, to overcome
the various bargaining breakdowns that
exist when a strong system of libertarian
rights is given full force and effect. The
state can thus use coercion to overcome
across
the problems of exhaustion of the fishery
or the common pool of resources, so long
as it pays just compensation to those
people whose property is sacrificed for
the common good. The hard questions,
over which I still have much doubt, are
policies of income and wealth
redistribution whose results I fear are
often counterproductive no matter how
laudable their motives,
As an initial foray, I think that it is
useful to divide the question of
affirmative action into two parts. The
first is whether an institution should be
allowed to practice affirmative action;
the second is whether, if that right is
conceded, an institution should take the
opportunity that is extended to it. The
d
fact that I am deeply skeptical about
establishing state institutions of higher
learning as a matter of first principle
makes matters more difficult; it is still
necessary within the present social
O
environment to ask whether the same
answers to these questions should be
given for public and private institutions.
The source of my uneasiness about public institutions of
higher education is as follows. One dominant feature of state
run institutions is that they offer tuitions, particularly for instate students, that are far below cost and far below a market

policy. A n affirmative
action prdogram blunts
the imp licit subsidy

cla sses, although
ipreservi¢s the implicit
subs ies across

persons. 1Italso leads to
an overa l decline in
academic standards,

and to a I,alkanization
of opinion that can

ft

ividef iculties and

student.from each
ther.

clearing price. The huge subsidy leads
to a long queue of applicants, only some
of whom can be accepted. The
traditional tests of merit have led to the
unhappy situation where well-to-do
students gathered up a huge portion of
the places, which were funded by tax
revenues collected from less affluent
persons whose children were unable to
meet the stiff academic standards. The
implicit redistribution of wealth from
rich to poor cannot be defended as a
coherent form of social policy. An
affirmative action program blunts the
implicit subsidy across classes, although
it preserves the implicit subsidies across
persons. It also leads to an overall
decline in academic standards, and to a
balkanization of opinion that can divide
faculties and students from each other.
Since we cannot privatize state
institutions, at least in the short run, the
preferred solution, therefore, is to raise
tuition levels to bleed out much of the
subsidy on all sides. The matter,
however, is sufficiently complicated that
I cannot address it at length here. For
these purposes, I will treat state
universities as indistinguishable from
private ones with whom they compete
on uneven terms, and get on with the
analysis of the affirmative action
problem proper.
Who Decides?
Turning to the first question of
affirmative action, I think that private
firms and institutions should be allowed
to engage in affirmative action programs
as a matter of course with no questions
asked, and that they should be allowed
to adopt systems of quotas with the
same degree of freedom.1 My views on
this subject are, however, subject to a
major caveat, namely that the

antidiscrimination laws under Title VI12 and elsewhere must
first be repealed. As I see it, the case for limiting the right of
private institutions to engage in affirmative action rests solely
on the need to maintain some counterweight to the enormous
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pressures to adopt affirmative action
affirmative action policies, reverse
The presence of Title whose
programs that the antidiscrimination laws
discrimination policies, or colorblind and
impose on private institutions. The current
sex-blind policies are most attractive.
VII thus muddies the
legal system looks very closely at any
Indeed, it is just this empirical sense that
practice whose effect is said to
the pain of exclusion (suffered under any
discriminate against certain protected
regime) is smaller than the pain of
waters and makes it
groups. In many cases, perfectly sensible
discord, where entry is free and
and ordinary practices, the kinds that one
alternatives are numerous, that undergirds
difficult to decide
would observe in an environment in which
my libertarian principles.
all persons were of the same race or sex,
Let me see if I can further illustrate the
which ongoing
may be attacked on the basis of the
point. I believe the great mistake in the
differential success enjoyed by members
debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1964
of the two groups. That pressure can
was the insistence that "we the people"
affirmative action
induce a firm or a law school to adopt an
could make a collective determination
affirmative action program which it would
that matters of race and sex were
programswould
not adopt if left to its own devices.
irrelevant in most (if not all) hiring
Because the pressures all come from
situations, educational programs, and the
survive and which
one direction, it is difficult to conclude
like. The error in that proposition
that all affirmative action programs are
surfaced before the ink was hardly dry on
voluntary. The counterfactual assertion the Act. The call went up not for a
would perish.
that these programs would remain in force
colorblind system that looked only to the
even if Title VII were repealed tomorrow
merits, but for a race and sex-conscious
has to be viewed with some caution, for even if the
system that required certain balances within given institutions.
programs remained, they might take on a different form or be
pursued less intensely than we currently observe. Yet, by the
same token, some of the massive political sentiment that has
led to the present legal configuration under Title VII would
continue to exert its influence, so we cannot conclude that all
affirmative action programs are simply part of a coldly
calculated plan to minimize anticipated liability under suit.
The difficult question is finding out which portions of the
programs are attributable to fear of legal sanctions and which
are not. The presence of Title VII thus muddies the waters
and makes it difficult to decide which ongoing affirmative
action programs would survive and which would perish.
But what should be done in an environment in which there
is no Title VII? At this point there is no need to create a
counterweight against affirmative action. Indeed, there may
be institutions that for reasons sufficient unto themselves
decide to base their hiring or admissions policy on grounds of
race, religion, or national origin. In general, however, I
regard this as a welcome safety valve and not a matter for
public worry and concern. The concentration of certain
individuals in select groups changes the composition of other
groups of which they are no longer members. It follows,
therefore, that these other groups will find it easier to practice
affirmative action if they so choose. The internal divisions
that mark this battle are reduced by a voluntary sorting
mechanism, where all persons search out the institutions

The categories of merit and race, and merit and sex were not
regarded as mutually exclusive. The legal debates over the
interpretation of a colorblind statute have all been about ways
that courts, through dubious and artful means of construction,
have reversed field on the original social understanding and
left, in the wreckage, a host of dubious and refined theories of
statutory construction that no one would have thought fit to
3
embrace if the political stakes had not been so enormous.
The initial mistake of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was not its
preference for neutral colorblind and sex-blind norms, but its
insistence that there should be any collective blindness norm
at all. Such a social norm should not exist; let those firms and
universities who think one way do what they will, and let
others go their separate ways. In this regard, it is a mistake to
assume that the profit maximization posited by classical
economics, or indeed any other plausible social objective,
imposes an economic or legal duty on private organizations.
It is merely a prediction on how they are likely to behave,
given the usual postulates of maximization by self-interested
persons. If that prediction is falsified because some
institutions decide that it is in their interests to sacrifice cash
return, or academic excellence, or equality of persons, then so
be it. The theory of description and prediction should be
revised, but the world should not be recreated in the image of
a theory that has failed. Private institutions should be allowed
to adopt the policy of their choice, and the economic theorists
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can hastily add another argument into
individual or composite utility functions in
order to explain how the unanticipated
behavior still maximizes utility - a utility
that is imperfectly correlated with cash
return on the basic investment.
Decentralization of the affirmative action
decision could yield enormous gains. I do
not abandon my libertarian instincts

[Ijt is cl !earthat the

America 7 Association
of La w Schools

(AALS ')hasgone

simply because the stakes have gotten
higher. High stakes provide all the more
reason why these questions should be
correctly decided.
Public institutions are, of course, a
different issue because they are funded by
tax revenues and their employees act as

representatives of all citizens. The

institutions, either public or private, are
unable to obtain the requisite approval.
The great debate over the existence,
extent, success, and justification for
affirmative action should slow down
those individuals whose moral certitude
outruns their capacity for wise selfrestraint. Just as it is odious to have any
character test for admission to the bar that
takes into account the political beliefs of
applicants, it is also odious at the
institutional level to have any system of
accreditation that departs from questions
of excellence and enters into the swirling
waters of partisan politics. I think that it
is utterly inadvisable for the champions of
a colorblind or sex-blind standard to
impose their views on the rest of the
world through the accreditation process.
The situation is no better - and perhaps
worse in light of its retreat from any
universal appeal - when the champions
of affirmative action work overtime to
attack defenders of the colorblind
standard. It is clear that both sides cannot
be correct in their moral suppositions.
But there is nothing that stops both sides
from being incorrect, first in their
judgments, then in their willingness to
back their judgments with force.
Solutions to this vexing and controversial
issue will require prudence and restraint rather than aggressive
intervention.

astray in its

insistenc on tying the
adopnion of an

affirmative action (or

principle of freedom of contract has less
appeal for the state than it does for private
in
parties, owing both to the coercive power
of the state on matters of revenue and
taxation, and the enormous monopoly
position that it enjoys through its control
of licenses, incorporation, highways, and
4
indeed every area of public affairs. The
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
ample testimony to the proposition that a
system of limited government must
r
constrain the way in which the government
contracts and regulates. I confess an
enormous fear of any system of selfconscious favoritism, and I am most uneasy about any public
institution that singles out one group for special treatment. It
is only the widespread public support for affirmative action
that causes me to relent against my better judgment and to
tolerate the dominant practice of affirmative action, which in
practice today will be directed only toward some protected or
favored groups. But even here we should struggle to find
some way to limit the scope or extent of the practice.
If I am correct in my assessments, then it is clear that the
American Association of Law Schools (AALS) has gone
seriously astray in its insistence on tying the adoption of an
affirmative action (or indeed a nondiscrimination provision of
any sort) to its accreditation rules. Initially I am very troubled
why any body should have the power to order accreditation, at
least where it functions as more than a Good Housekeeping
Seal of Approval. Yet AALS and ABA certification count for
more than this, given that the ability of graduates to gain
entrance to the practice of the bar may be blocked if

deed a
nondis(,rimination

provisioL of any sort)
to its accreditation

ules.

The Wisdom of Affirmative Action
Although I am willing to let the chips fall where they may,
in some instances - or to be more precise in one instance I have to approach the question of affirmative action not only
as an outside observer or a would-be regulator. But also, like
other academics, I must make a moral judgment as a member
of my institution's governing structure. So, speaking only for
myself, am I for it or against it?
My first impulse is not to answer this question at all, for I
would be stunned if there were any universal solutions to the
affirmative action question. Although to the outside world all
law schools, like all lawyers, may seem pretty much alike,
when we move closer we realize the wide range of differences
that exist among institutions. Some have national influence;
others are regional or statewide; and still others exist to serve
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local markets. Some law schools have
night programs and others do not.
Some specialize in areas that reflect the
interests of their communities: logging
and environment in the Northwest, race
in the inner city, health care in rural
communities, and so forth. In some
instances the student bodies have strong
credentials and the affirmative action
stretch - that is, the departure from
traditional standards - may be great;
in others the adjustments that are
required to establish the program could
be far smaller. Some universities
receive public funding; others are
private; and still others have a religious
orientation. The range of variables is
so numerous that it is quite possible that
each institution will think that it fits
into a single cell. It is highly
improbable that the same approach to
affirmative action will be adopted
across the board because the costs and
benefits of that decision will be
markedly different. We should,
therefore, foster - and it is a theme to

appropriate to decide merit for
prospective faculty members: grades,
law review experience, clerkships, work
experience, references, areas of expertise,
writing, and the like.
The manner in which the traditional
standards of merit are fashioned is
irrelevant to this decision. To say that
race is irrelevant across the board, for
example, is to affirm that two decision
sets always yield equal outcomes if their
first variables are equal: Decision(Merit,
Racewhite)
=
Decision(Merit,
Raceblack), and so on down the line, for
any level of Merit. Similarly if Merit X
is greater than Merit Y for two applicants,
then X is preferred to Y, regardless of
who is Racewhite or Raceblack. In
essence the rejection of affirmative
action reduces the class of facts that have
to be taken into account. Given the
assumed irrelevance of certain variables,
a uniform and unambiguous procedure is
advanced.
Once it is decided that race or sex is to
be regarded as a relevant factor, matters
are very different. For now, someone has to figure exactly
how much weight these factors ought to be given. At one
extreme it is possible to have a decision rule in which
Decision(Merit,Racewhite) < Decision(Merit,Raceblack), no
matter what values the Merit variable assumes for the two
candidates. In effect this is a principle of strict racial
exclusion that in form (if not in motive) is indistinguishable
from the practices of Jim Crow whereby explicit racial
segregation or exclusion occurred at all levels of education.
Few members of mainstream institutions embrace this
alternative because it implies that the supporters of the
program, who are white or male, should be excluded from
participation in it by virtue of their color or sex alone, unless
there is some exemption for current faculty and students as the
price to procure their support. Yet, once this extreme
alternative is rejected, someone has to decide exactly how
much of an affirmative action preference will overcome
whatever differences exist on the merit scale.
At this point, the alternatives become difficult. One
approach is simply to accept the soundness of the usual
standards, and then to agree on the size of the affirmative
action discount. It becomes appropriate, therefore, to decide
to add one point to a grade point, or points (on the new scale)

It is highly improbable

that the same approach
to affirmative action

will be adopted across
the boardbecause the
costs and benefits of
that decision will be

markedly different. We

should, therefore,foster
... diversity across law
schools.

which I shall return - diversity across law schools.
The great temptation, therefore, is to say nothing at all, but
I shall overcome it in order to address a set of issues that are
of concern to us all. In dealing with the problem I shall focus
first on the relationship of affirmative action to merit selection
generally. Next, I will address the forward and backward
justifications for affirmative action, or, as it is now called,
diversity. And finally, I shall discuss the special problems
associated with faculty hiring.
Traditional and revised standards of merit
Let me start with one observation: it is far easier,
conceptually, to be against affirmative action than it is to be
for it. My point has nothing to do with the intrinsic
desirability of the alternative decisions, but with the logic of
the decisions under the two different regimes. To hold fast
against affirmative action in all its manifestations is to adopt a
very simple rule of decision. Variables that are collectively
regarded as measures of merit but that ignore matters of race
and sex offer the only permissible measures. Grades, boards,
letters of recommendation, interviews, and other similar
elements are normally among the variables used in measuring
student merit. A somewhat different mix of variables is
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ijustment on

to a Law Board Score in order to make the
If the a
requisite comparisons in the admission
process. A political decision determines
grades
the number chosen, and the absence of any
clear benchmark suggests that there could
is undel
be enormous difficulty in procuring any
collective agreement on the size of the
necessary adjustments. In addition, this
procedure requires decision makers to
confront the level of formal differences
actual
that might exist on admission criteria,
most notably board scores and grades. If
the adjustment on grades or board scores is
undertaken without knowledge of the
at
actual differences between group scores,
then an institution risks the embarrassment
of having an affirmative action program
ril
with only a tiny number of affirmative
action admissions. That would be the
case, for example, in many elite
institutions if the size of the affirmative
having
action preference were only equal to the
preference given to the children of alumni.
Thus, the tendency in practice is to reverse
action p
engineer the process and to decide on the
level of the bonus only after the
a ti
anticipated harvest of new students from
that adjustment has already been
affirmt
estimated. Any insistenc6 that an
educational minimum be set before the
process draws to a closure is often lost in
the political struggle.
A second approach to the question of
affirmative action is much more thorough in its implications.
The approach argues that the bonus point idea is wholly
incorrect because it assumes that the word "merit" should be
placed in quotation marks: any measure of merit is itself a
product of racist or sexist institutions, and should, therefore,
not be given any respect at all. The idea of adding points, or
overlooking weaknesses, or reversing the order of candidates
is thus displaced by a system that decides to overhaul the
entire admissions process, and by implication, the educational
process from stem to stem. It is at this point that I fairly
blanch, for while I am quite willing to admit that any
admissions procedures based on the traditional norms will
make whoppers in individual cases, I cannot think of any set
of decision tools that I would adopt, apart from the affirmative
action question, that could be regarded as preferable in the
broad spectrum of cases.

o r board scores
taken without

knowi edge of the
differences

between group scores,
then
institution
sks the

embarassment of
n affirmative

rogram with

only

7y number of
itive action

adn issions.

I do believe that the traditional
standards - the standards of excellence
under which I was raised, educated,
tested, hired, and promoted - are valid
standards and that the candidates who
have progressed under this system are
by and large better than those whose
search for positions has proved in vain.
The constant reconceptualization of the
academic universe may have appeal for
some. But no matter how refined and
strained their arguments, no substitute
exists for persons who can write clearly
and think straight, and who are
comfortable with a wide range of fields
and approaches, from metaphor in
poetry to the elegance of the normal
distribution in statistics. There may be
practices in law schools and other
institutions of higher education that are
worthy of our sharpest condemnation,
but the standards of excellence are ones
that we should not sacrifice merely
because we do not like the racial or
sexual identities of the people that we
get, or the compromises that we have to
make, when we use some version of
merit correction in order to design and
implement an affirmative action
approach.
Moreover, there is a sense in which I
think that the concern with merit and
excellence is recognized even by the

supporters of affirmative action. Affirmative action divides
the admissions process into two or more pools. But rank
orderings have to be made in each of those pools, given the
two queues for individual places. As long as slots are not
reserved exclusively for affirmative action candidates,
someone has to decide the standards that should be used in
order to admit the rest of the class. In this regard, I have
never seen the slightest willingness on the part of any law
school to take the same skeptical attitude toward the
traditional tests of merit urged in the debates over setting up
affirmative action programs. Instead the usual rules are
followed, and the revised, skeptical account of merit is
reserved only for the affirmative action candidates that, by
definition, cannot get in under the traditional standards. Yet
within the pool of affirmative action candidates, does it make
sense to ignore board scores and grades, especially when we
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can only substitute personal connections
and political litmus tests in their place? If
one really thinks that these traditional
standards are misguided or worse, then
they should be abandoned across the
board. But they are not. For want of
anything better they are normally
preserved in both pools.
This point also has important
implications about the way in which an
affirmative action program, if any, ought
to be run. The use of quotas has been
powerfully denounced in this land, even
by those who support affirmative action
programs. But why? If an affirmative
action program is to be adopted, then
quotas should be used because they strip
away the illusions of what is being done
and preserve at least some fraction of the
advantages of the traditional system. We
can rigorously insist that applications
within the affirmative action class be
ranked by the usual standards of merit.
The incentives for hard work thus can be
partially preserved, and the opportunity for
political influence and intrigue which
always arises with the adoption of
discretionary standards can be curbed.
The question of who gets in under
affirmative action should not depend upon
political affiliations, personal contacts, and
influence, or any of the other factors that
have made impersonal admissions such an

In principle,
I cannot mount any
persuasive legal
objection, that is, an

objection of sufficient
weight to justify the
public use offorce, to

any form of
discrimination
practicedby private
institutions,no matter
how odious and
offensive I regard
their behavior.

important part of the legal system. So all in all, I think that
we should not shoot the messenger if we have affirmative
action. The merit adjustment system is a way to limit the
problems with affirmative action while acknowledging the
traditional requirements for excellence that should dominate a
university-an imperfect accommodation, to be sure, but a
sensible one nonetheless.
Backward and Forward Looking Justifications
The inquiry, at this point, can go in one of two directions:
first, do we adopt an affirmative action program at all, and
second, if we adopt it, what is the size of the variation? Here I
shall again concentrate on student admissions where the
explicit standards might play a larger role than they should in
the area of faculty hiring. I think two general classes of
justifications can be used for affirmative action, but I find that

each is incomplete. The first of these
classes regards affirmative action as a
system of rectification for past systematic
wrongs, and thereby employs the
language of corrective justice for the
redress of grievances. The second of
these classes puts aside the issue of past
wrongs, and argues on a forward-looking
basis that affirmative action, now
relabeled diversity, is necessary for the
good of the institution at large. Let me
comment on both of these.
Rectification
About rectification, my libertarian
instincts leave me more or less of two
minds. In principle, I cannot mount any
persuasive legal objection, that is, an
objection of sufficient weight to justify
the public use of force, to any form of
discrimination practiced by private
institutions, no matter how odious and
offensive I regard their behavior. Just as
others cannot use their sense of outrage to
limit my sense of action, I cannot use
mine to limit theirs. But historically I do
not regard decisions to adopt
exclusionary programs as invariably free,
and for the same reason that I do not
regard the contemporary programs of
affirmative action as voluntary. The
threat of legal force skewed the
alternatives so that it was harder to

maintain a colorblind institution in the face of official Jim
Crow, and for the inverse set of reasons, it is very difficult to
maintain colorblind institutions today.
The pervasive nature of the wrongs influences the choice
of remedy. The easy question is whether the older system
should be dismantled, and to that the only appropriate
response is yes by destruction of root and branch; no person
who believes in limited government can think that the proper
role of the state is to sponsor the oppression of one group by
another. Removal of older barriers is cheap to do and easy to
monitor. Far harder questions arise, however, about
compensatory justice, where it is necessary to ask whether
damages should be paid for past wrongs. It is here that I think
the problems are insuperable in many instances, although
again it is critical to ask the question in two different ways.
The first approach is to ask whether any individual victims
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orm of

of discrimination should be allowed to
If son,~e
prejudiced are excluded yet a second
time?
maintain actions against private persons.
The initial difficulty is that private
Diversity
discrimination (apart from its coercive
The analysis then shifts to the other
state setting) is, in my view, not a private
it shoul
wrong. And even if it were, who is the
side of the line. Do the forward-looking
wrongdoer in any particular case, given the
justifications for affirmative action offer
system-wide adoption of the practices?
an explanation that the compensatory
ones do not provide? Today, it is evident
To pick out single threads from elaborate
that these justifications have gained
tapestries is beyond the power of a system
ground in recent years, as is shown by the
currenc
of litigation. So, the quest has to be
abandoned, and it typically is. If there is a
rise of the insistence on diversity in
education as an objective for affirmative action. In principle,
system of individual remedies, therefore, it must be directed
no one seriously wishes to attack diversity. To speak of
against government or public bodies who were responsible for
diversity is an effective way to get around the questions of
the wrongs. But again, the passage of time makes the damage
differential standards that are so troublesome with affirmative
the
It
is
difficult
to
identify
remedy very problematic.
action programs. People are not accepted because they have
particular victims of discrimination. In some instances
been victims, nor are they given any special preference.
persons who were discriminated against in time A received
Rather, they are accepted out of the conviction that their
which
could
some race-based benefit from the state at time B,
presence in the university or law school will enrich the
well count as compensation for the wrong suffered, if not in
academic and other learning experiences that take place there.
addition, the creation of still a new wrong against still a third
There are, however, some deeply troubling aspects to the
class of persons. But whether it is a simple down payment on
trend toward diversity. First, in some cases the
current
a larger obligation, or an overpayment on an obligation fully
position
is disingenuous. It is supported by people who think
discharged, it is beyond my power to say. All that is clear is
that
affirmative
action is justified for the traditional
that the year is no longer 1960, and it is no longer a question
reasons,
but who are uneasy about saying so in
compensatory
of undoing a past of unrelieved domination in one direction.
just
those
terms.
At
least
I have never heard anyone announce
The crosscurrents and interactions of the past thirty years
that
he
or
she
is
torn
by
being
opposed to affirmative action as
make it far harder to identify victims and wrongdoers.
it in the name of diversity.
a
means
of
redress,
but
supports
In addition, if there is to be compensatory justice to
between
the
views
is too strong to be purely
The
correlation
identified victims, it surely should take the form of cash
coincidental.
payments and not special places in law schools or other
Second, neither diversity nor any other educational goal
academic institutions. Awarding places for compensation
clearly
justifies the level of coercion that the AALS wishes to
implications
of
damage
actions,
but
may avoid the budgetary
impose on law schools. If diversity is so great a good, then it
it does nothing to remedy the previously existing situation.
should be apparent to all, and coercion through accreditation
The place that is granted in compensation to X is taken from Y
(as we cannot assume that institutions have infinite capacities
should be unnecessary. In truth, however, diversity is often
the calling card for practices which are the exact antithesis.
to expand). A further question arises as to why such
The typical justification for diversity is that variety within
displacement should be tolerated when the wrongs of the past
institutions provides a certain insurance against bad times, just
can be paid off without weakening the institutions that have to
the way diversification of a financial portfolio provides
prepare students for tomorrow. If Y is someone who has
protection against a risk that hits one firm but not others. Yet,
benefitted from other government programs' largess, then the
if all institutions hew to the diversity line, then diversity
situation is more odd because affirmative action becomes a
across institutions is lost; for if the program itself is flawed,
tool for the benefit of some rich people at the expense of those
then all institutions will suffer the adverse consequences
who are not as wealthy. If some form of restitution is
associated with that flaw. A system of diversity applied at the
required, it should be paid in cash and not in the currency of
institutional level, therefore, does not require all institutions to
places. And once the point is put in that fashion, I think that
use the same criteria on hiring or admissions, but invites them
there would be enormous reluctance to recognize the claim at
to experiment with different policies of their own. If there are
all. Why should only the fortunate admittees receive
those who think that a homogeneous student body or faculty
compensation when other persons, who also may have been

restitutioJn isrequired,

d be paid in

cash andn ot in the

yo
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promotes learning and education, then the
principle of diversity at the institutional
level should allow them to have their way.
Thus, the principle of diversity, far from
supporting a system of mandatory
affirmative action, calls for a withdrawal
of the affirmative action question from the
accreditation system.
Nevertheless, whether an institution
wants diversity is a question that has to be
answered wholly apart from coercion.
Along some measures I think that diversity
is desirable. I am very comfortable with
the position that students and faculty

should be drawn from

different

backgrounds, have different intellectual
orientations, and represent a broad

spectrum of political views. But it is a

If we al !ow diversity

to bec )mea code
wordfor ort hodoxy on
matters )fardmission

or appoi, tments, then
we sat

independ ence

of afal

seSod-

with race or sex. In my own experience as

a teacher I have seen little evidence of that

of

thought inthe name

dangerous business to assume that

intellectual diversity is heavily correlated

"rifice our

very highSpn

proposition. I know men, both as
colleagues and students, who have been
the most passionate defenders of pro-choice positions on the
abortion question, and women, as colleagues and students,
who have stressed the sanctity of life, even before birth.
Many white persons have voiced the keenest awareness of
racial injustices in society. I have seen conservative faculty
and students who are black, and I have seen liberals who are
white. I am sure that there is some correlation between
viewpoints and race or sex, but I think that diversity is, if
anything, advanced by hearing the traditional positions
advanced from unaccustomed quarters and defended with
strange twists. Diversity of opinions can be achieved by
getting able people to think for themselves. This was a goal
of the traditional admissions and appointments procedures,
and one that they were able in large measure to achieve.
What matters is not the tags of race or sex that people bring to
a debate, but what they say, and what they say has to stand on
its own. In my vision of the university, everyone always has
to be at risk in order to maintain intellectual sharpness and
excellence. The university should be the one place in which
all persons with odd accents, strange dress, and different
mannerisms can participate in and profit from a single debate.
It is where intellectual separatism should be viewed with
hostility and suspicion. If we allow diversity to become a
code word for orthodoxy on matters of admission or
appointments, then we sacrifice our independence of thought

a

pay.
ice toofairly

in the name of a false god -

price to pay.

a very high

Student Admissions and Faculty Hiring

In dealing with affirmative action thus
far, I have lumped together questions of
student selection and faculty hiring. But
some important differences between them

should be noted. A law school takes
anywhere from one hundred to six
hundred students in the course of one
year, and it must admit some multiple of
the entering class. Necessarily, limited
information is available about each
student, and it is impossible to make an
accurate guess of how any student will fit
into the student body or the life of the
institution as a whole. At some level, the
costs of affirmative action programs
when measured against the traditional
standards of excellence are limited, at
least if the size of the program is kept

small.

With faculty appointments, the stakes
are higher. It is no longer a question of whether one can get
through, but a question of whether faculty can add to the sum
of human knowledge and can teach at the level necessary to
bring out the best in students. I think there is far less play in
the joints than with student admissions. In this regard I am
dismayed to see that in recent years the question of
affirmative action has gone from being an issue of some
weight to surging to the fore as the central and perhaps only
issue that matters. In the years that I have sought to help
Chicago graduates get positions in the teaching market, it has
become clear that the affirmative action discount is large for
sex and huge for race, and that political matters have become
so enmeshed in hiring decisions that some "diverse" faculties
today ask whether it is permissible to hire anyone whose
politics put him to the right of Teddy Kennedy.
An example will give some sense of what the gaps are: a
black woman who finishes in the middle of her class stands as
good or better a chance of getting a teaching job than a white
male who has finished first, and who shows on his resume
clerkships, law review positions, or key government jobs.
The discrimination that one sees is very widespread, in part
because it is buttressed by a powerful antidiscrimination law.
When the current dual standards are justified, the argument
often reverts to attitudes and verbal distinctions that I had
hoped were no longer prevalent. Thus it is said that white
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men are not "excluded" from positions,
but that they will only be considered
after the market has been combed for
women and minorities who can take
those positions. It is as though Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act said that it was
proper to discriminate against persons as
long as there was not a complete refusal
or failure to hire them.
The situation then leads to constant
internal confusion, for once hiring takes
place, evaluations have to be made on
teaching and scholarship, and here it is
difficult to maintain the same standards
as were previously applied, given the
known weaknesses in the initial hire. It
is nice to say that affirmative action
hiring has worked out and that
candidates have outperformed their
records, but it cannot be the case that
long shots always finish in the money.
If the standards applicable to affirmative
action cases were universally applied,
then the exhaustive search that has been
made for hiring would have been
misguided because huge numbers of
applicants who never could have
received positions would also be able to
do the work. Matters only become more
vexed as affirmative action hires
become affirmative action tenure
appointments. Then, they rise to a
position in which they pass judgment on
the next generation of candidates, but
without a secure scholarly base on
which to make their judgments. At this
point, there is a tendency for standards
of excellence to be eroded, because
everyone has to speak in code about the
reasons for or against a candidate. The
lack of candor is one of the major costs
of an affirmative action program.
And does it have any benefits? Here
again I am driven to the skeptical side of
the line. On balance affirmative action
shows few social benefits. In some cases it might encourage
persons to work harder because they know they now have a
chance that before they never would have received. But at the
other end, affirmative action encourages people who might

have worked hard to slack off, secure in
the knowledge that the existing
preferences will allow them to advance.
A system that may help some in the
middle, but which dulls the incentive to
succeed at the top, is surely not a good
long-term social investment. And with
the enormous commitment to affirmative
action, it is very clear that the overall
situation on race relations has not gotten
obviously better, and in recent years may
have gotten worse.
In the end I think that universities have
to be jealous of the traditions and
standards that gave them the excellence
they need to survive and that has earned
them the respect of the public at large.
Affirmative action programs are not small
additions to a university that can be kept
off to one side while business as usual
continues. They go to the heart of what a
university is and how it defines its
mission. It is very difficult to serve two
masters well, especially in the long run.
We cannot have both excellence and
active affirmative action programs, or
perhaps any affirmative action programs
at all. In our capacities as faculty
members and students, I am still naive
enough to think that we should make
academic excellence our dominant
concern.
It seems, therefore, that I have taken a
position that cuts sharply against
affirmative action, and yet I have been
over the years moderately tolerant of a
practice over which I have grave
intellectual reservations. It is, in part,
because so many of my colleagues are
persuaded by truths that I do not believe
that I have never had the position to turn
my own skepticism into a hard and fast
stance. In part there are political reasons.
I think that any institution that is all white
or all male will not be able to maintain the
support of the public at large or even of its own alumni. On
matters of race it is difficult to conceive of an institution that
has no black and no Hispanic students, which would be close
to the result under a colorblind admission system. Faced with

On balance affirmative

action shows few social

benefits. In some cases
it might encourage

persons to work harder
because they know they

now have a chance that

before they never would
have received. But at
the other end,

affirmative action

encouragespeople who
might have worked
hard to slack off,
secure in the

knowledge that the

existing preferences
will allow them to
advance.

The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy

HeinOnline -- 2 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 42 1992-1993

The Uneasy Truce

the extreme differences in outcome, I move to a position
where I am uneasily tolerant of practices that, on balance, I
think are unwise.
I do not expect to persuade everyone to adopt relative
rankings of what counts for the success of a law school or
other academic institution, but that only brings me back to the
first section of this paper. In areas of disagreement there are
two possible approaches: the first is to insist that all

institutions follow a single rule determined by collective
choice. The second is to allow each institution to go its
separate way and then to allow each to reevaluate its own
course of action in light of its own experience and the
experience of others. This second course of action has led to
the greatness of American universities. Its implicit
repudiation in the affirmative action programs will do much to
hasten their decline.

Notes
1.
For a discussion of this point at greater length, see RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 412-421 (1992).
2.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1983), makes it an unfair employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any individual with repect to hiring or the terms
of employment on the basis of an individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.

3.

For two notable examples, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 283-285 (1989), and CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 201-205 (1990), both
criticised in EPSTEIN, supranote 1, at 401-405.
4.
For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Forward:
UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power and the Limits of Consent,
102 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1988).
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